We use data from Kauffman Firm Surveys to analyze the capital-structure decisions of U.S. startup firms. First, we analyze whether start-up capital structure explains whether or not a firm will remain in business after its first three years. We find that firm using debt in their capital structure, and, in particular, business debt, are significantly more likely to survive. Second, we analyze whether start-up capital structure explains how fast a firm will grow during its first three years. We find that firms using debt, and, in particular, business debt, grow faster. In other words, the capital structure decision of a start-up firm does, indeed, matter, in terms of both its survival and growth. Having established why capital structure matters for start-up firms, we then turn to how start-up firms finance their assets. We find that, at start-up, the majority (55%) of firms rely upon personal credit, and also a sizable fraction of firms use business credit (44%) and trade credit (24%), but that a significant portion (24%) use no credit. Third, we analyze what factors explain a start-up's decision to use credit; its decision as to what type of credit to use (business or personal credit); and, conditional upon using credit, how credit is allocated across business and personal credit. We find that both firm and owner characteristics explain the use of credit.
Introduction
How do start-up firms finance their assets, and why does it matter? According to most corporate finance textbooks, the capital-structure decision-how to finance a firm's assets-is one of the three most important decisions facing a financial manager; second in importance only to the capital-budgeting decision. 1 Yet we know very little about how the manager of start-up decides on the capital stack of various types of debt and equity she will use to finance her firm's assets because most existing empirical studies of capital structure have focused on large publicly traded corporations, for which data are readily available. 2 In this study, we expand the capital- We provide important new evidence on why the capital structure decision of a start-up firm matters. First, we analyze whether capital structure explains whether or not a start-up will remain in business after three years or whether it will be forced to close down operations. We find that firms using debt in their capital structure are significantly more likely to survive than are firms using no debt; and we find that firms using business debt, as opposed to personal debt, also are more likely to survive. Second, we analyze whether the capital structure decision explains how fast a start-up will grow during its first three years of operations. We find that firms using debt in their capital structure grow faster than do firms using no debt; and we find that firms using business debt, as opposed to personal debt, also grow faster. In other words, the capital structure decision of a start-up firm does, indeed, matter, in terms of both its survival and growth.
Having established why capital structure matters for start-up firms, we then turn to how start-up firms finance their assets. We find that, at start-up, the majority (55%) of firms rely upon personal credit, and also a sizable fraction of firms use business credit (44%) and trade credit (24%), but that a significant portion (24%) use no credit at start-up.
Finally, we analyze what factors explain a start-up's decision to use credit; its decision as
to what type of credit to use (business or personal); and, conditional upon using credit, how credit is allocated across business and personal credit. The richness of KFS data allows us to examine the relations between firm and owner characteristics and credit use.
Based upon our multivariate tests using logistic regression analysis, we find that firms are more likely to use credit at start-up when they are larger in terms of revenues and total assets, are organized as corporations, and have lower credit risk. Firms with competitive advantage and firms that provide products only are more likely to use credit, while firms that provide products and services are less likely to use credit. Firms with more educated primary owners are more likely to use credit. Black-owned firms are significantly less likely to use credit.
Among firms that use credit, we find that larger firms are more likely to use business credit but less likely to use personal credit; firms with more assets are more likely to use business credit; firms with better credit scores are more likely to use business credit but less likely to use personal credit; corporations are more likely to use business credit; firms with multiple owners are less likely to use personal credit; black owners are less likely to use business credit; and firms with owners who work more hours in the firm are more likely to use business credit.
Why is our study important? According to the U.S. Department of Treasury and Internal
Revenue Service, there were more than 23 million nonfarm sole proprietorships, more than 2 million partnerships with less than $1 million in assets and more than 5 million corporations with less than $1 million in assets that filed tax returns for 2006. These small firms are vital to the U.S. economy. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, small businesses accounted for half of all U.S. private-sector employment and produced 64% of net job growth in the U.S. between 1993 and 2008. Also, recent research by Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2010) indicates that the majority of all job creation is accounted for by start-up firms at their creation and that majority of job destruction is accounted for by start-up firms during their early years, when many of those firms fail. Therefore, a better understanding of what types of firms use credit and the sources of credit finance can help policymakers to take actions that will lead to more jobs and faster economic growth. Furthermore, a better understanding of credit use by young entrepreneurial firms during economic downturns can help policymakers to create an environment with fewer credit constraints for nascent entrepreneurs.
Our study contributes in several important ways to both the entrepreneurship and finance literatures. First, we contribute to the growing literature that analyzes data on start-up firms from the Kauffman Firm Survey. (See, e.g., Coleman and Robb 2009; Fairlie and Robb 2009; Cole 2011; Coleman and Robb, 2011; Robb and Watson, 2011; and Robb and Robinson, 2013) . We present new evidence on the use of credit by start-up firms during their first year of existence.
Second, we contribute to the strand of the capital-structure literature that focuses on privately held firms. (See, e.g., Ang, 1992; Berger and Udell, 1998; Cole, 2008; Ang, Cole and Lawson, 2010; Cole, 2013; Robb and Robinson, 2013) . We provide new evidence on the mix of credit upon which privately held firms rely at start-up. Finally, we provide new evidence to the growing literature on zero-debt firms. (See, e.g., Strebulaev, 2006; and Cole, 2010) . We document that about 24% of privately held firms are financed exclusively with owners' equity at the firm's start-up. Cole (2010) finds that about 20% of all privately held firms also are financed exclusively with owners' equity, no matter their age.
The remainder of our study is structured as follows. In section 2, we review relevant studies from the literature on the liability structure of small firms and develop hypotheses. In section 3, we describe our data and methodology. In section 4, we present our results, following by a summary and conclusions in section 5.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

Capital Structure of Closely Held Firms
Harris and Raviv (1991) review the theories of capital structure. The pecking order theory of financing demonstrates that capital structure is driven by firms' desire to finance new investments, first internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally with equity (Myers, 1984) .
According to the trade-off theory, a company chooses how much debt and how much equity to use by balancing the costs (i.e., the dead-weight costs of bankruptcy) and benefits (i.e., tax saving) of debt (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) . A large body of empirical research has developed around these theories. We limit our review of the literature to the studies examining closely held firms. Cole (2008 Cole ( , 2013 uses data from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBFs) to examine whether these theories explain the capital structure of small, privately held firms in the U.S. Small firms are limited in their external borrowing to financial intermediaries such as banks, finance companies, and other business lending institutions. His results are broadly supportive of the pecking-order theory, in that leverage is negatively related to firm size, age, profitability and credit quality; and positively related to tangibility and limited liability. In a subsequent paper, Cole (2010) analyzes differences between small U.S. firms that do and do not use credit. He finds that about one in five small firms use no credit whatsoever;
and that firms using no credit are significantly smaller, more profitable, more liquid and of better credit quality than borrowing firms. Cole concludes that this evidence is generally consistent with the pecking-order theory of firm capital structure.
Ang, Cole and Lawson (2010) also use data from the Fed's SSBFs to analyze capital structure at privately held U.S. firms, but limit their analysis to firms owned entirely by a single individual. They find that personal risk tolerances account for 30% -60% of the explained variation in capital structure at these firms, and that leverage is positively related to owner age, experience, and sophistication, as well as to firm size and the number of financial institutions with which the firm has relationships.
Robb and Robinson (2013) use data from the Kauffman Firm Surveys to document that, in contrast to the widely-held view about entrepreneurial finance, outside debt is extremely important at the earliest stage of a firm's life. They document that the largest part of total financial capital comes from outside debt, followed by: owners' equity, insider debt s, outside equity, and owner debt. Surprisingly, the least used source of capital at the earliest stage of business development is inside equity. Robb and Robinson (2013) conclude that newly founded firms rely heavily on formal debt financing rather than on informal funding from friends and family.
Our study complements Robb and Robinson (2013) by providing additional analysis of the use of debt by start-up firms, adding clarity to the picture that Robb and Robinson (2013) began to paint. We focus on the use of credit by start-up firms.
Hypotheses Development
Our primary hypotheses relate to the differences between firms that use credit ("usecredit firms") and firms that use no credit ("no-credit firms"). This eliminates a large number of potential explanatory variables, such as firm leverage and the outcome of the firm's most recent loan application, as these variables can only take on meaningful values when the firm uses credit.
However, there remain a large number of variables of interest that we can use to test our hypotheses-many of which are tied to the pecking-order theory and trade-off theory of capital structure.
The pecking-order theory of capital structure suggests that profitable firms, firms with more "financial slack," and firms in certain industries that require little in the way of tangible assets use less debt than other firms. We also expect that corporations, since they enjoy limited liability, should be more likely to use credit than firms with other forms of business organization.
Behavior finance suggests that owners of no-credit firms act irrationally, as these firms are failing to take advantage of either the interest-free financing from typical trade credit terms or the debt-tax shield from bank financing, as well as the opportunity to leverage up their return on equity. The managers of these firms may simply be financially unsophisticated, or may have an irrational aversion to debt of any form and prefer to pay cash for all purchases. We hypothesize that no-credit firms are more likely to be located in rural areas, and have owners with less experience and less education than other types of firms. We also examine whether the primary owner's race or gender determine the firm's use of credit.
Data and Methodology
Data and Sample Description
We use data from the Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) to examine the use of credit by start- the KFS data, see Ballou et al., 2008; and DesRoche et al., 2012) . 
Methodology
In order to provide new evidence on the use of credit by start-up firms, we employ both univariate and multivariate tests. In all of our tests, we incorporate the survey sampling weights because the KFS sample is not a random sample, but, instead, is a stratified random sample where high technology firms are over-represented relative to firms in other industries.
We first explore whether the initial credit conditions (i.e., the use of credit at a firm's start-up) are associated with positive firm outcomes; specifically, survival and growth in terms of We explore the relation between the use of credit at the firm's start-up and two outcomes observed three years after the firm's establishment: survival and the level of revenues. With these performance measures, we are capturing the stability of the firm and its growth during the first critical years of newly founded firms. Furthermore, we test whether the relation between credit use and firm outcomes is different for corporations and non-corporations.
The first part of our performance analysis examines the relation between the use of credit at the firm's start-up and firm survival. Prior studies document that the first few years of firm operations are critical for firm survival. We explore whether the use of credit at the firm's startup is associated with higher probability of survival during these first critical years. We also differentiate between the use of business credit and personal credit.
Although logit models are frequently used in finance to estimate the probability of an event, Shumway (2001) argues that single-period logit models produce biased and inconsistent estimates when dealing with multiple-period data. In contrast, survival functions (e.g., hazard functions) follow the firm through time and observe at which point in time it experiences an event of interest. Another advantage of survival models is that they incorporate data truncation;
that is, if some events are unobserved because they occur beyond the end of the sample period, they are taken into consideration through right censoring. While different types of models can be used for survival analysis, the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model is the most popular choice because it does not assume a particular distribution for the probability of survival times; thus, it does not require the exact specification of the baseline hazard function. It is a semi-parametric model that employs a maximum partial likelihood estimation method and has the following form:
where: ß is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.
The hazard rate is the probability that firm i will be out of business at the end of year t, conditioning on firm i surviving up to time t.
In our analysis of revenues, we use the level of revenue from 2007 KFS as our dependent variable; and we use credit, firm, owner characteristics, and information about the other sources of capital from 2004 KFS as independent variables. We examine the firm's use of credit in a multivariate framework using the following Weighted-Least-Squares (WLS) regression: Owner Characteristics is a vector of variables related to the primary owner, such as prior work and start-up experience, the number of hours worked in the firm, age, age 2 , education, race, ethnicity, and gender; and
Other Sources of Capital is a vector of variables that indicate whether a firm used trade credit, insider equity, outside equity, or insider debt; it also includes the outsider debt and owners' equity, both scaled by total capital (debt plus equity).
We provide definitions for our variable in Table 1 .
Distribution of Firms by Use of Different Types of Credit at the Firm's Start-Up
In the next part of our analysis, we examine the distribution of firms by use of credit. A firm is classified as using credit if the firm reported using business, personal, or trade credit in the 2004 survey.
We then differentiate between business and personal credit. A firm is classified as using business credit if the firm reported using credit in any of the following categories: business bank loan, business credit line, business loan from nonbank institutions, business credit card, business credit card issued on owner's name, or business loan from the government, other businesses, or other sources. A firm is classified as using personal credit if the firm reported using credit in any of the following categories: personal bank loan by the primary owner, or by other owners; and the primary owner's, or the other owners' use of personal credit cards for business purposes.
This classification scheme distinguishes financing through the personal balance sheet of the entrepreneur(s) from financing through the business balance sheet of the firm.
We explore the distribution of firms by use of different types of credit at the firm's startup. We examine the percentage of firms that use credit and different types of credit; the percentage of firms that use only one type of credit; and the percentage of firms that use a combination of credit types. We then examine the differences in credit use and credit types between corporations and non-corporations.
Factors Explaining the Use of Credit
In the final part of our analysis, we examine what types of firms are more likely to use credit and different types of credit at the firm's start-up. We first conduct univariate tests for differences in means of various firm and owner characteristics between firms that do, and firms that do not, use credit. For those firms that do use credit, we analyze differences in firm and owner characteristics between firms that use business credit and firms that use personal credit.
In a multivariate analysis, we estimate a bivariate probit model with sample selection.
Our selection equation estimates the probability of using credit; in our outcome equation, we estimate the probability of using business (personal) credit, conditional upon using any type of credit. We use a probit model because our dependent variables are binary and we use a bivariate is equal to one, so the error terms in eq. (3) and eq. (4) must be re-specified as єj = exp (γj , zj) uj, where (u1, u2) have the bivariate standard normal distribution. The estimated correlation coefficient ρ (the correlation between error terms є1 and є2) can be used to test for selection bias. If ρ is statistically significant, then we can reject the null hypothesis that selection bias is not present. X is a vector of independent variables as described above in equation (1) 
Data Analysis and Empirical Results
Credit Use and Firm Performance
In this section, we examine whether the firm's initial capital-structure decisions regarding In Table 3 , we present the results from our survival analysis and allude to the idea that firms that use credit at the firm's start-up are more stable, as measured by the hazard rate of going out of business. In hazard models, the regression coefficients give the proportional change that can be expected in the log of hazard rate, given the change in explanatory variables. The Table presents hazard ratios, which equal 100*(e ß -1) and summarizes the economic significance of a given variable.
In column 1 of Table 3 , the coefficient for Credit is a statistically significant 0.851, which
indicates that a firm that uses credit at start-up has about a 15% lower hazard rate of going out of business; or, alternatively, a 15% greater survival rate. Furthermore, as shown in column 2, this relation is driven by the use of business credit; the coefficient for Business Credit is a statistically significant 0.848, while the coefficient for Personal Credit is not statistically significant in explaining the firm's survival rate.
We sequentially add a vector of firm characteristics, a vector of owner characteristic, and a vector of controls for use of other types of financial capital. Controlling for differences in firm, owner, and other financial capital characteristics (columns 3, 4 and 5), we find that the coefficient of Business Credit is statistically significant at better than the 0.01 level, and its level falls to 0.77 -0.80, indicating that a firm obtaining business credit at start-up has a 20%-23%
higher survival rate than does a firm unable to obtain such financing. As shown in column 5, Business Credit is the only significant capital-structure variable.
Reviewing our control variables in columns 3-5, we find that several are consistently significant at the 0.10 level or better. Firms with intellectual property, firms that provide product and service, firms with older owners, firms with better educated owners, and firms whose owners have greater prior experience in the same industry are less likely to fail. In contrast, firms that provide product only, and firms whose owners have a higher number of prior start-ups are more likely to go out of business.
In column 6 of higher survival rate. This is consistent with the signalling argument that firms able to obtain credit in the name of the firm are of higher quality. is not significant.
Revenues
In column 6 of Table 4 , we replace our Business Credit and Personal Credit variables with interaction terms that multiply these two variables by our indicators for Corps and NonCorps. This enables us to test whether our results are being driven by limited liability firms. As shown in column 6, we find that the coefficient on interaction term Business Credit*Corp is positive and significant, indicating that corporations using business credit at the firm's start-up perform better than corporations that do not use credit at the firm's start-up. However, for NonCorps, there is no significant difference in performance between those that do, and do not, use business credit. Furthermore, we find that Corps using personal credit at start-up perform worse than do Corps that do not rely of personal credit at start-up.
Overall, the results presented in Table 4 show that the use of credit at the firm's start-up provides information about future firm performance. Furthermore, the relation between credit use and firm performance varies depending on the type of credit. One possible explanation is that the ability of a firm to secure business and trade credit at the firm's start-up indicates that the firm is less capital constrained and, hence, should be able to grow faster than more constrained firms that cannot obtain such financing (see, e.g., King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . Another possible explanation is that firms that obtaining business and trade credit at start-up are of better quality than firms unable to obtain such start-up financing. In other words, lenders assess that these firms have better prospects and, hence, are willing to provide credit. Use of business credit and trade credit at start-up is simply a signal for higher quality firms. This line of reasoning would explain why the use of personal credit is negatively associated with revenue level: firms that are not able to secure financing backed only by the firm's balance sheet (i.e., business credit and trade credit) due to poorer future prospects are forced to rely of personal types of credit. Alternatively, the negative coefficient on Personal
Credit could indicate that the owners of firms that use personal credit at the firm's start-up are more "conservative" due to a levered equity position in the firm and prefer slower revenue growth than do less conservative firms.
In addition, Table 4 
Use of Credit at the Firm's Start-Up
In Table 2 ). possible that business credit is backed by personal guarantees and personal collateral, the fact that a majority of start-ups explicitly uses personal credit, while a significant minority uses business credit suggests that there are important differences in these firms and in their capitalstructure decisions.
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The break-out of business credit and personal credit into finer categories shows that personal credit cards of the primary owner is the most common credit type used (46%), followed by business credit cards (over 25%). The results show that a smaller percentage of firms rely on bank credit: only about 20% of start-ups use personal bank loans taken out by an owner, only 9% use business credit lines, and only 7% use business bank loans. Our analysis complements that of Robb and Robinson (2013); they focus on the amounts of outsiders' debt, whereas we focus on the incidence of credit use and on the distinction between business vs. personal credit.
Our findings provide some important insights that contribute to the literature on credit use by start-up firms. For example, while Robb and Robinson (2013) show that the amount of credit card balance is small relative to other sources of funds, we document that start-up firms rely on credit cards more often than on any other type of credit financing. Alternatively, while nonbank business loans and government business loans are large in size (see Table 4 in Robb and
Robinson, 2013), extremely few firms (less than 1%) receive either of these types of financing at start-up. 6 The KFS does not provide data on personal guarantees or personal wealth of the entrepreneurs in 2004 so we cannot directly test this proposition.
The results in Panels B and C, which exclude firms that do not use credit, closely resemble the results presented in Panel A, which includes all firms. Only 6% rely exclusively on trade credit, whereas 29% relay exclusively on personal credit and 16% rely exclusively on business credit. Panel C shows the portion of firms relying upon multiple types of credit: 24% use both personal and business credit, 13% use a combination of trade credit with either business (6%) or personal credit (7%), and 12% rely on all three types of credit
In addition to the analysis of credit use by all firms, Table 5 Overall, our results in Table 6 show highly significant differences in the means of firm and principal owner's characteristics for firms that do, and do not, borrow at the start-up. In terms of both revenues and total assets, business borrowers are significantly larger and more likely to be organized as Corps, whereas personal borrowers are significantly smaller and less likely to be organized as Corps. Using data on privately held firms of all ages from the SSBFs, Cole (2010) also documents that borrowers are larger than are non-borrowers. These results are consistent with the premise that entrepreneurs choose to organize the business as a corporation in order to avoid the unlimited personal liability of sole proprietorships and partnerships. If the liability issue is an important factor in choosing the form of business organization, then it is not surprising that corporations try to avoid the form of debt that carries the largest personal liability, i.e., personal debt.
Firms that use business credit have higher business credit scores, whereas firms that use personal credit have lower business credit scores. This suggests that it is more difficult for firms with higher credit risk to raise funds without personal guarantees.
Finally, firms that use business credit are more likely, whereas firms that use personal credit are less likely, to have multiple owners. There are a number of potential explanations for this: for example, owners might want to avoid unlimited liability from personal borrowing when they have only a portion of residual cash-flow rights; and multiple owners provide access to the equity beyond the personal wealth of the primary owner, and this equity is a substitute for personal borrowing that entails unlimited liability; multiple owners complicate the underwriting of personal loan, especially if business collateral is involved. It also may be that the owner of a single-owner firm decides to borrow on personal account to cover business-related expenses so that she can avoid having to share residual cash-flow rights with other equity holders.
Table 6 also shows that use-credit firms and no-credit firms exhibit significant differences in the characteristics of the principal owner. Among firms that use business credit, the primary owner is less likely to be female or black, whereas, among firms that use personal credit, the primary owner is more likely to be female. These results complement prior findings that small firms owned by minorities experience more difficulties in obtaining financing than firms owned by non-minorities. (See, e.g., Coleman, 2002; Blanchflower et al., 2003; Cole, 2009; Coleman and Robb, 2009; Fairlie and Robb, 2009; Robb and Watson, 2011) .
Finally, Table 6 illustrates that the primary owner's education and work experience may affect the use of credit at the firm's start-up. Firms that use business credit are more likely to have owners with graduate degrees; and firms that use personal credit have owners with less experience in the same industry.
Multivariate Analysis
In Table 7 , we move to multivariate analysis, utilizing a weighted bivariate probit regression model with sample selection to examine the firm's decision to use credit. In the first stage of the bivariate probit model (column 2), the dependent variable takes a value of one if the firm uses any type of credit and takes on a value of zero otherwise. Conditional upon using credit in the first stage, the second stage simultaneously estimates the probability of using business credit/personal credit; the results of this analysis appear in columns 3 and 4, respectively. In each of the four columns, we report odds ratios over t-statistics (in parentheses).
As shown in column 2 of Table 7 , firms that use credit are significantly larger as measured by both revenues and assets. The economic significance of these variables is four percent higher odds of using credit for one percent increase in revenues, and an almost six percent increase in the odds of using credit for one percent assets. 7 In general, corporations are 16% more likely to use credit than other forms of business organizations combined. Furthermore, firms with greater credit risk are less likely to borrow at the start-up. A one-step decrease in the firm's credit category is associated with 13% lower odds of obtaining credit. Firms with competitive advantage are 15% more likely to use credit. Firms that provide product only are 7 We add one to cash and revenue in order to avoid creation of missing values when we perform logarithmic transformations on those variables.
38.5% more likely to use credit, while firms that provide products and service are 19% less likely to use credit. Table 7 also shows that several owner characteristics significantly relate to the probability of using credit at the firm's start-up. Firms with owners who have more experience in the same industry are less likely to borrow funds; but the effect is not economically significant.
Corps are 15% more likely to borrow than Non-Corps, which is consistent with the limited liability afforded to business loans. Firms with worse business credit scores are significantly less likely to borrow, with the odds declining by 11% for each increment in the categorical credit score. Firms reporting that they have a competitive advantage are 15% more likely to borrow than other firms without advantage. Firms that only produce a product are almost 40% more likely to borrow than other firms and firms that produce both a product and a service are almost 20% less likely to borrow than other firms.
Firms with owners who are college educated are 20% more likely to borrow, while firms with owners who have a graduate degree are almost 60% more likely to borrow. Consistent with prior studies documenting lower availability of credit to minorities, our results show that firms with Black owners are more than 40% less likely to use credit at start-up. Finally, firms with higher owners' equity and firms with the contribution of insider equity are more likely to use credit at the start-up.
In columns 3 and 4, we present the results from the second stage of the selection model, which estimate the probability of using business credit or personal credit, respectively, conditional upon using any type of credit. These results document notable differences between firms that use these two different sources of credit. Our results also show that owner characteristics have significant effects on the probability of using a given type of credit. Firms that are owned by females are 18% more likely to use personal credit, but are no less likely to use business credit. Firms with highly educated owners are 20% likely to use business credit, but no less likely to use personal credit. Firms with Black owners are more than 30% less likely to use business credit, but no more likely to use personal credit. Firms that report using insider debt are almost 20% less likely to use business debt and almost 30% more likely to use personal debt.
Summary and Conclusion
In this study, we use data from the Kauffman Firm Survey provide new evidence on how U.S. start-up firms choose their initial capital structure and why this decision is important. First, we establish that the initial capital structure decision is important because it influence future outcomes in terms of survival and growth. Firms that use debt in their initial capital structure, and, in particular, firms that use business debt rather than personal debt, are significantly more likely to survive their first three years of operations and, if they survive, have significantly higher revenues.
Second, we document the initial capital structures that these firms choose for financing their start-up assets. We find that more than one in five firms report 100% equity financing of their initial assets. For the remaining 75% of start-ups, we analyze their sources of credit, which we classify into three categories-trade credit, personal credit, and business credit. We find that, at start-up, the majority of firms (55%) Among firms that use credit, we find that larger firms are more likely to use business credit but less likely to use personal credit; firms with more assets are more likely to use business credit; firms with better credit scores are more likely to use business credit but less likely to use personal credit; corporations are more likely to use business credit; firms with multiple owners are less likely to use personal credit; black owners are less likely to use business credit; and firms with owners who work more hours in the firm are more likely to use business credit.
Our study contributes, in several important ways, to both the entrepreneurship and finance literatures. First, we contribute to the growing literature that analyzes data from the Kauffman Firm Survey by presenting new evidence on the use of credit by start-up firms.
Second, we contribute to the strand of the capital-structure literature that focuses on privately held firms by providing new evidence on the mix of credit upon which privately held firms rely at start-up. Finally, we provide new evidence to the growing literature on zero-debt firms. We document that about 25% of start-up firms are financed exclusively with owners' equity. 
Credit variables:
Credit Dummy variable, equals 1 if firm reports that it used either trade credit, business credit, or personal credit.
Business Credit Dummy variable, equals 1 if firm reports that it used business credit. Business credit includes either of the following categories: business bank loan, business credit line, business loan from nonbank institutions, business credit card, business credit card issued on owner's name, business loan from the government, business loan from other businesses, business loan from other sources.
Personal Credit Dummy variable, equals 1 if firm reports that it used personal credit. Personal credit includes either of the following categories: personal bank loan by the primary owner, personal bank loan by other owners, the primary owner's personal credit card used for business purposes, and the other owners' personal credit cards used for business purposes.
Other Sources of Capital:
Trade Credit Dummy variable, equals 1 if firm reports that it used trade credit.
Outsider Debt/Total Capital Outsider debt, divided by total financial capital (debt + equity). Outsider debt is as defined in Robb and Robinson (2013) and is the sum of balances of the following sources of capital: personal bank loan by the primary owner, personal bank loan by other owners, business bank loan, business credit line, business loan from nonbank institutions, business credit card, business credit card issued on owner's name, business loan from the government, business loan from other businesses, business loan from other sources, other individual loans.
Owners' Equity/Total Capital Total equity invested by all owners, divided by total financial capital (debt + equity).
Insider Equity Dummy variable, equals 1 if either spouse or parent provided equity financing.
Insider Debt Dummy variable, equals 1 if either family, employee, or any firm owner loaned money to the firm, primary owner, or other owners.
Outsider Equity Dummy variable, equals 1 if informal investors (i.e., angel investors), businesses, government, venture capitalists, or other entities provided equity financing. The table reports hazard ratios from the Cox proportional hazard model. The dependent variable is the probability that firm i will be out of business at the end of year t, conditioning on firm i surviving up to time (t = 2005-2007) . Independent variables are from KFS 2004 and are described in Table 1 . N is the number of observations. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Survey weights applied. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table 1 . N is the number of observations. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Survey weights applied. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Industry dummies are included in the regressions 3-6 but are supressed for brevity. The table reports differences in firm and owner characteristics between firms that use credit and firms that use no credit. Panel A includes the full sample of firms. Panels B and C exclude firms that use no credit. Panel B presents differences in means between firms that do, and don not, use business credit. Panel C presents differences in means between firms that do, and do not, use personal credit. In each panel, columns 1 and 2 report mean values of a given variable for firms that use (column 1), or do not use (column 2), credit. Column 3 reports p-values for difference-in-means t-tests. Column 4 reports the number of nonmissing observations N for that variable. Variable definitions are provided in Table 1 . Survey weights have been applied. ***, **, and * indicate that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
